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Body World and Time:
Meaningfulness in Portability
Rumiko Handa
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Introduction
Architectural scholars and professionals have
long recognized the erosion of culturally endowed architectural meaning: technology transfer
has caused the relationship between form and its
means, so evidently reciprocal in indigenous construction, to crumble.1 Natives and tourists alike
now deprecate traditional architecture while applauding the pseudoauthentic.2 If the irreversible
universalization of technology and of man constitutes “a sort of subtle destruction, not only of
traditional culture … but also of what I shall call
for the time being the creative nucleus of great
cultures, that nucleus on the basis of which we
interpret life,” is architecture doomed to lose its
rneaningfulness?3
Portable architecture allows us to contemplate how architecture may still be meaningful
in the absence of cultural imprimatur, It may be
compared to the temporal and spatial adaptation
of a literary work, say, Macbeth performed by Kabuki actors in London and Tokyo, While translation and reinterpretation make the original literary piece portable, architecture, in order to make
sense in a foreign land, needs to achieve portability of meaning through use of its own elements,
such as color, form, and texture.
This paper will examine two portable theaters: Aldo Rossi’s “Teatro del Mondo” and Tadao
Ando’s “Karaza.” Wherever they are set, they succeed in being meaningful architecture, Through
their inherent properties, pure to the point of
abstraction and rudiment, they ground themselves in the basic references of humanity: body,
world, and time.

An insistence on the rudiments is clear in
Ando and Rossi. Ando stated:
I believe three elements are necessary to
crystallize architecture, One is authentic
materials, or to put it another way, materials that possess substantiality, The material
can be, for example, unadorned concrete
or unpainted wood. The second element
is a pure geometry, which provides the
foundation or framework that enables a
work of architecture to have presence. It
might be a mass in the form of a Platonic
solid but more often is a three-dimensional frame, The last element is “nature.”
By this I do not mean nature in the raw
but instead a — man-made nature — chaotic nature that has been given order by
man, or order abstracted from nature, It is
light, sky, and water made abstract. When
nature in such guise is introduced into a
building composed of authentic materials
and a pure geometry, architecture itself is
rendered abstract by nature, Architecture
acquires power and becomes radiant only
when materials, geometry and nature are
inteqrated.4
I will examine the discussions of architectural
meaning of the latter half of this century, influenced primarily by the linguistics of Ferdinand
de Saussure. The issues raised, especially that of
arbitrary versus natural, have a significant bearing as to how much meaning of a particular architecture is bound to a specific place. I will then
examine the notion of text, in the tradition of
hermeneutics and especially in the works of Paul
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Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Their understanding of textual interpretation opens up many
more possibilities than the application of linguistics to architecture, There arises a possibility
for appropriating a piece of architecture at various locations, with such an interpretation that
is supported in a nonarbitrary manner by its inherent properties as a text and can stand a rigorous examination. To contrast with the linguistically driven concept of meaning, I will propose to
consider meaningfulness in architecture, Finally,
the notion of culture will be redefined. This analysis will lead to a conclusion that culture which assigns a meaning to a form deserves less attention
than culture that keeps a form alive and inherited
as meaningful.
Culturally endowed meaning of
architecture
In consideration of the culturally endowed
meaning of architecture on the one hand and
meaningfulness of portable architecture on the
other, the first theoretical question to be reviewed is of the relationship between a form
and its content. Form here addresses the physical properties of architecture while content, or
meaning, should be considered the metaphysical
counterpart of a form. Some critics of architecture, such as Umberto Eco, Charles Jencks, and
Alan Colquhoun, have argued that the meaning of
an architectural form is assigned in an arbitrary
manner, with the relationship being made possible solely by a societal agreement. One recognizes a certain influence of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. Toilet bowls used for cleaning
olives by the population in southern Italy has become a favorite example used to illuminate the
arbitrary nature of form–meaning retatlonships.5
Alan Colquhoun emphasizes the culturally
endowed arbitrary meaning of architecture over
what he calls the “expressive content,” in his assertion of typology over the modern architectural theory. To argue against the notion of the
expressive content in a form, Colquhoun refers
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to E. H. Gombrich, in particular to “Expression
and Communication,” in Meditations on a Hobby
Horse.6
Gombrich demonstrates that an arrangement of forms such as is found in a painting by Kandinsky is, in fact, very low in
content, unless we attribute to these
forms some system of conventional meanings not inherent in the forms themselves,
His thesis is that physiognomic forms are
ambiguous, though not wholly without expressive value, and that they can only be
interpreted within a particular cultural
ambiance.7
The idea that a form has in its inherent properties very little to generate a meaning, but a culture endows a meaning to a form, is similar to
the fundamental argument Ferdinand de Saussure
held concerning a word and its meaning when he
introduced his notion of semiology in linguistics,
Colquhoun states:
This attitude toward signification, though
related explicitly in some of Gombrich’s
writings to information theory, has a certain resemblance to that of structural linguistics based on de Saussure. According
to de Saussure, the linguistic sign is comprised of a signifier and a signified, and
while these are arbitrarily related, they
form an indissoluble unity.8
Saussure developed an argument that “the linguistic sign is arbitrary,” in which sign is defined
as the unity between signified (a concept) on the
one hand and signifier (a sound-image) on the
other.9 Saussure is aware of possibilities of natural signs, and cites pantomime as an example,
However, he stresses the arbitrariness by stating that the main concern of semiology as a new
science “will still be the whole group of systems
grounded on the arbitrariness of the sign.” Saussure stresses that any sign, or “every means of
expression” for that matter, as long as it is “used
in society,” “is based, in principle, on collective
behavior” or “on convention”:10
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The term [arbitrary] should not imply
that the choice of the signifier is left entirely to the speaker (we shall see …
that the individual does not have the
power to change a sign in any way once
it has become established in the linguistic
community).11
Saussure’s argument is buttressed by the refutations he offers against the anticipated counter-arguments concerning interjections and
onomatopoeia.12
If we accept that a sign is arbitrary and that
“every means of expression used in society is
based, in principle, on collective behavior or on
convention,” as Saussure stresses, then we need
to ask if architectural meaning is also based on
the assignment by the collective behavior or on
convention.13
Dialectically opposed, at least seemingly so,
are those who claim to have found in certain inherent properties in architectural forms the basis for their meanings. Geoffrey Broadbent and
others have argued for architecture as iconic
sign, while Juan Pablo Bonta indicated that architecture is, at least to a certain extent, “systems of indication which need not be codified.”14
These studies are based on Peirce’s semiotics
rather than Saussure’s semiology. To compare
with Saussure’s, Peirce’s definition of sign covers
many more subject matters than words in a language, for, according to Peirce, a sign is “something which stands to somebody for something
in some respect or capacity.”15 As a result, Peirce
gives the same degree of attention to what Saussure would call natural or motivated signs,
which in Peirce’s terminology are icons and indexes, as he does to symbols, or Saussure’s arbitrary signs.16 In comparison, Saussure’s strong
insistence in arbitrariness of sign is at least justified when we recognize that his study is focused
strictly on languages as used, without attention
to the origin of word formation.
A careful examination of these studies reveals that Saussurian architectural critics did not
mean the two positions to be exclusive. Even Jen-
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cks, a strong believer in preponderance of arbitrary meaning in architecture, did not ignore the
peculiar nature of architectural meaning: “In comparison with spoken language, the architectural
language is more ‘motivated’ and less ‘arbitrary’
which is to say that it has a higher ratio of indexical and iconic signs.”17
It is possible for a single piece of architecture to have both aspects simultaneously, or the
weight may shift between the two in the course
of time. However, when presented in contrast,
these two positions seem to detach culturally
granted architectural meaning from portable architecture, For portability includes a move from
one culture to another, Portable architecture’s
meaning, then, may be limited to that which is
iconic, and arbitrary meaning will presumably be
lost in the course of a shift to another culture,.
Saussure’s exclusion of, or disinterest in the
making of a word — when he rejected onomatopoeia and interjections as natural signs and
insisted the focus of attention be on the usage
of a word — is a crucial flaw, at least from an
architectural point of view, The understanding
of arbitrariness in word-meaning relationships
in linguistics, when applied simplistically, gives
too much authority to the culture as a meaning
giver to an architectural form, while regarding
form as having very little to do with the meaning in itself. Under this assumption, the meaning of architecture is fixed, and a viewer without the culture of origination has no possibility
of making sense out of the form. Architectural
communication then is limited to what is considered right by the original cultural community,
They become responsible for the transmission
of the correct meaning.
Eco is not unaware of the possibility in
which an artist tries to embed a self-referential
code in an object of art, To compare with Saussure’s position, Eco takes an interest in how an
artist makes a sign. After stating that “all the ingenuity of an architect or designer cannot make
a new form functional (and cannot give form to
a new function) without the support of existing processes of codification,” Eco retrieves the
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possibility of making architecture governed by
its own code:
This does not mean that the architect is
necessarily confined to old, already known
forms, Here we return to a fundamental
semiotic principle that we have discussed
elsewhere, apropos of artistic messages, a
principle quite well explained in the Poetics of Aristotle: one can institute moments of high information-content, but
only when they are supported by a certain amount of redundancy: every flash of
the unlikely rests on articulations of the
likely.18
Unfortunately, Eco, in the section immediately
following this quotation, excludes architecture
from the sphere of art, and as a result, gives little
thought to the possibility of self-referential code
in a piece of architecture, For Eco, architecture
is a “type of design producing three-dimensional
constructions destined to permit the fulfillment
of some function connected with life in society,”
but not as “the production of three-dimensional
objects destined primarily to be contemplated
rather than utilized in society, such as works of
art.”19 Can we say, however, that portable architecture, without much reliance on culturally endowed meaning, has this type of self-referential
code? When Jencks translates this semiotic notion of aesthetic code into a prescription for architectural practice, the discussion takes a peculiar turn:
The tendency is for architecture to dramatize its aesthetic codes, its secondary
and tertiary levels, in five major ways.
1. Fetishism and the self-reflection of the
aesthetic code. Since architecture is a
connotative system it can focus on the
expressive plane of meaning with such
obsession that the expression becomes the content.
2. Distortion and disruption in the aesthetic
code. A favorite device of Robert Venturi for calling attention to the scale

11

of his architecture is the ornamental
stringcourse or molding, which is often placed where it shouldn’t be.…
3. Redundancy and miniaturization in the
aesthetic text. Another reason reading architecture takes more time than
reading building is the redundancy of
messages that refer to themselves
and even to small messages within the
whole.…
4. … another aspect of the aesthetic text,
is that it is hermeneutic, esoteric and,
even at its limits, completely private.…
The difficulty in decoding these texts,
the aesthetic effort and time expended in making up plausible meanings as you look at an unfamiliar architecture, are obviously all part of the
aesthetic game.
5. … it is continuously open to new interpretation, multivalent and plural in
its range of meanings…. Yet there is a
far more important aspect of multivalence than this: the ability of the aesthetic text to articulate radically different experiences, emotions and values as
a whole.20
[Italics added by author)
Obviously Jencks has postmodern, ironic architecture in mind, and this fact is revealed by the
words I have italicized above. One might say that
Jencks’s strong interest in postmodern architecture has limited his consideration of the self-referential code in a piece of architecture to those
of irony and superficiality, Having lost, as modernists such as Adolf Loos have pointed out, the
root of tradition, does it follow that postmodern irony, succeeded by deconstruction’s express
denial of meaning, is the only possible way for
architecture?21
Architecture as meaningful text
There is another way of looking at architectural meaning, which requires a piece of architecture to be a text, the organization of related
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parts, which gives rise to a certain meaningfulness.22 Text here goes beyond “any discourse
fixed by writing,”23 but retains a semantic autonomy in the sense that a gap “inserts itself between saying and what is said.”24 The responsibility of author can be considered, and the
relevance of an interpretation discussed in a nonarbitrary manner. Here, architectural communication, then, is more like an appreciation, and
sharedness of culture is based on the possibility
of an architectural piece making sense in different settings. Culture then will be given a possibility of expanding communication in the world, instead of being an alienating influence.
Hermeneutics is the study of interpretation,
whose original inquiry can be found in the work
of Aristotle, and developed as the study of Biblical scriptures.25 Much closer to our time, Immanuel Kant’s statement regarding the interpretation of Plato drew the attention of, for example,
Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher (1768–1834), William Dilthey (1833–1911), and Martin Heidegger
(1889–1976).26 In Critique of Pure Reason, the second edition of which came out in 1787, Kant
stated:
I need only remark that it is by no means
unusual, upon comparing the thoughts
which an author has expressed in regard
to his subject, whether in ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently
determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention.”
The contemporary development of hermeneutics may be seen in the works of Paul Ricoeur
and Hans-Georg Gadamer, with the philosophical
foundation of phenomenology.
The significance of phenomenological hermeneutics is two-fold: appropriation and distanciation. First, the significance of interpretation of a
text lies not so much in arriving at the subjective
intention of the author but rather in the appro-
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priation of the text. Here, to appropriate a text
through interpretation should be considered as,
with the word’s etymological root in the Latin
appropriare — “to make one’s own.” Appropriation of text is then “to make one’s own” what
was initially “alien,” so that “interpretation brings
together, equalises, renders contemporary and
similar.” Through the act of appropriation, the interpreter “does not seek to rejoin the original intentions of the author, but rather to expand the
conscious horizons” by “actualising the meaning
of the text.”28
Armed with this notion of appropriation, one
might draw a distinction between hermeneutic meaning and linguistic meaning.29 In particular,
I would rather extend the former term to “hermeneutic meaningfulness.” To understand the distinction between these two notions, it may be
helpful to imagine something which has a meaning, yet is not meaningful — a stop sign might be
an example — and a case in which something’s
meaning is unknown, and yet it is acknowledged
as meaningful, as, for example, the famous stone
heads of Easter lsland.30
Here I would draw attention to Rossi’s interests in the Sardinian monument.
Sometimes I regard time as a plastic object, in which elements whose original
meaning we have forgotten, are preserved,
alongside the fragments of a beautiful building. … We cannot, however, always put together what has been broken
and therefore take little interest in understanding what has been forgotten. …
There is a Nuraghian monument in Sardinia that I have always attempted both to
understand and to imitate. It leads down
into the earth and is nothing but a stairway leading to a point, lit from above. …
It always seems to me unbelievable that
this great architectural work of art should
not belong to the realm of architecture
as such, I find it unfortunate that its ancient meaning, if it ever had one, remains
a secret.31
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Secondly, seen as a text, one can study the relationship between parts and between a part and
the whole when evaluating an interpretation, by
which an interpretation can be explained in a
nonarbitrary fashion.32 “The meaningfulness of a
text … arises from its organization, the relationship among its parts and between the part and
the whole. As such it can be explained by an interpreter in a nonarbitrary fashion that can be
understood by another person … the organization of the text can be submitted for rational argument away from the subjective realm of the author or the interprete.”33
In order to understand the notion of distanciation, it might be useful to refer to Gadamer’s
discussion on memento, as a contrast to text.
An example may be a pebble I picked up in the
courtyard of the Louvre five years ago. Gadamer
states:
Of all signs, the memento most seems to
have a reality of its own. It refers to the
past and so is effectively a sign, but it is
also precious in itself since, as a bit of the
past that has not disappeared, it keeps the
past present for us. But it is clear that this
characteristic is not grounded in the being
of the object itself. A memento has value
as a memento only for someone who already — i.e., still — recalls the past. Mementos lose their value when the past of
which they remind one no longer has any
meaning. Furthermore, someone who not
only uses mementos to remind him but
makes a cult of them and lives in the past
as if it were the present has a disturbed
relation to reality.34
The meaningfulness of a text in comparison arises from its organization, the relationship
among its parts and between the part and the
whole. As such it can be explained by an interpreter in a nonarbitrary fashion that can be understood by another person.35 Based on appropriation and distanciation, the role of the author
can be argued. The author plays a crucial role in
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purposefully organizing the work so that it may
later be interpreted in a nonarbitrary way. The
organization of the text, which had embodied the
author’s meaning to the author, persists even after being detached from the author. This organization allows the interpreter to come up with
his/her own appropriated interpretation, but also
anchors the interpretation.36
As if for the purpose of ascertaining the
body of text, Rossi placed his theater on a boat,
which keeps its world wherever it travels, while
for Ando, the notion of bridge as both connection and separation between the two worlds is
important. Ando stated, in reference to his Japan Pavilion for Expo. ‘92, “The bridge in this pavilion takes visitors to a fictional world, a world
of dreams. Then again, it is a bridge spanning East
and West.”37
The making of a world, so to speak, of its
own, supported by its organization as a text,
works especially well in the case of theater. Theater, after all, is a place of representation created
by the playwright and actors. Supporting this notion of theater as a temporary creation of an illusory world is, in addition to the bridge of Ando
and the boat of Rossi, the use of scaffolding as
the buildings’ structure made visible at the eye
level as well as at the underside of the roof of
both theaters.
Hermeneutic meaningfulness requires much
more time than the linguistic meaning does
from an interpreter. It is usually important, when
a language is being used, for the people involved
to decipher the meaning instantaneously. We
can think about the frustration and ineffectiveness when one has not quite learned the specific language being used, or the case of simultaneous translation. However, architecture is
something that is there for a long time. Even
with temporary construction, the scale of time
span that is attached to a circus tent is drastically different from speech. One does not have
to have a simultaneous deciphering of meaningfulness out of architecture. Not only can one
take time, approaching, going through a doorway, through a hall and stairs, but one can also

Kara-za, Tadao Ando, Tokyo
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come back to the same building again and again
and enrich the experience of interpretation. It is
more important for a piece of architecture that
people take time to appreciate it. This requirement of time for hermeneutic interpretation in
return gives the reason why that piece stands
for the time it stands.38
Commenting on Ando’s buildings, Jackie
Kestenbaum points to the time required for
interpretation:

Geometry for theatre,Vitruvius, De Architectura, Giovanni Giocondo, 1513

To visit an Ando building is to relinquish
all presuppositions about architecture
and take on Ando’s Weltanschauung. …
to negotiate an Ando building is an arduous task, alternating exertion with contemplation, a process whereby the spatial phenomenon imprints itself upon the
mind and body and resonates for days. …
It is the resonance one feels in holy places,
where personal memory is not a prerequisite, where the place itself bears the
weight.39
As a demonstration of applicability and relevance of this distinction, one might compare
postmodern architecture and pseudo-authentic
as based on pseudo-linguistic meaning on the one
hand and Rossi and Ando based on hermeneutic
meaningfulness on the other. Postmodern architecture and pseudo-authentic are both signage,
while Rossi and Ando produced text.
Ando is sensitive of the problem of the
pseudo-authentic, and instead longs for materials,
such as concrete, and pure geometry, which are
devoid of past meaning that is no longer shared:

Plan of Roman theatre, Claude Perrault, Les
dix libres d’architecture de Vitruve, 1637

By trying to reproduce in modern materials (concrete and steel) and their suitable
techniques, forms that came into being in
relation to Japan’s traditional building material (wood) amounted to ignoring the inevitable and fundamental connections between material and form. For this reason
buildings making this attempt sustained
many difficulties and before long, ceased
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to emerge. The contradiction between the
unaltered forms of the past and today’s
living style, which differs sharply from the
living style of the past, is too great. … the
concrete I employ does not have plastic
rigidity or weight. Instead, it must be homogeneous and light and must create surfaces. When they agree with my aesthetic
image, walls become abstract, are negated,
and approach the ultimate limit of space.
Their actuality is lost, and only the space
they enclose gives a sense of really existing. Under these conditions, volume and
projected light alone float into prominence as hints of the spatial composition.
And this is what gives meaning to a geometric composition.40
One may say that meaning is to communication as meaningfulness is to interpretation. That
is, the former deals with the understanding of the
author, in the setting of a dialog, whereas the latter deals with the understanding of the text.41
Architecture as appreciated is not so much architecture as communicating. If architecture has
physical and spatial qualities in such a way that
a person, not necessarily with the same cultural
background as that held by the architect in designing, can approach it to appreciate, making
sense out of as many parts, the whole, and the
relationship between parts and the whole as possible, then this architecture is meaningful.
Role of culture and precedents
Now the question arises: what is the role
of cultures and precedents? Specifically, if culture has something to do with sharing among
a certain group of people, what is it that is
shared? Here, Colquhoun’s discussion on the exchange value is illuminating in the sense that for
Colquhoun, what is exchanged is not meaning of
a form, but rather, an ideal of the form, that is another kind of metaphysical counterpart to which
the artifact is a close physical approximation:
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… artifacts have not only a “use” value
in the crudest sense but also an “exchange” value, The craftsman had an image of the object in his mind’s eye when
starting to make it. Whether this object
was a cult image (say, a sculpture) or a
kitchen utensil, it was an object of cultural exchange, and it formed part of a
system of communication within society,
Its “message” value was precisely the image of the final form which the craftsman
held in his mind’s eye as he was making
it and to which his artifact corresponded
as closely as possible.42
The implication of hermeneutic meaningfulness is this. Pressing the distinction, I might
state that cultural sharedness does not so much
fix meaning into form — it rather lies in a form
which has a capability of staying meaningful.
Both Rossi’s and Ando’s theaters can be considered as attempts to keep the form which humanity has carried throughout the history. Vitruvius describes the ideal theater as based on a
circle and four equilateral trianqles.43 Palladio’s
design for Teatro Olimpico was a result of the
Renaissance appreciation of Vitruvius, and the
wooden tiers are arranged in half an ellipse. It is
convincing that the Shakespearean Globe Theater of Elizabethan London also had a reference
back to a Vitruvian description.44 As for the theaters by Rossi and Ando, it is not at all difficult to
derive from the Vitruvian arrangement of equilateral triangles, a square, a rectangle, and an octagon, three of which make up Teatro del Mondo,
while Ando’s dodecagon is immediately derived
from the twelve points of Vitruvian triangles. Ando’s explanation includes a reference to an Eastern view of the world:
I think a dodecagon represents the world.
The number twelve is symbolic of the
cosmos, In Japan, there are twelve animals
corresponding to the twelve-year cycle of
the calendar. In the West there are twelve
months to a year and so forth.”
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Rossi, being “superficially annoyed by the frequent accusation that there is a young architectural movement that imitates me and builds like
Rossi all over the world,” comments on Palladio:
Let us take an example that means
much to me. Palladio, as we know, created a style of architecture that is closely
linked to the spirit of a place, to the “genius loci.” Therefore, one finds the Venetian Palladio of villas and palaces, as well
as the Palladio visible throughout the
world — from Louisiana to Russia, from
England to France — where a wonderful
form of Palladian architecture has developed. I believe that certain English Palladian architects, such as the Adam brothers, have sometimes reached greater
perfection than Palladio himself. They
raised Palladian architecture to its peak,
and yet there is still a difference between this perfection and the Palladio in
Vicenza, or the Palladianism of his Italian
imitators who tend to be much more Baroque. I cite this example to show that
the basic principles of an architectural
style, once they have been created, exist over long periods of time and are capable of development. Modernism has
already partially attempted to do this, although I believe that its notorious failures result from the fact that it created a
caesura, not something continuous.46
Consider two cases: Victorian houses on the
one hand and the portable theaters by Rossi and
Ando on the other. Victorian style, surviving the
journey over the Atlantic once, has ended up as
kitsch-post-modernism and pseudo-authentic.
The two architects’ theaters, on the contrary,
keep alive the fundamental human appreciation of
geometry, which had already been expressed two
millennia ago by Vitruvius. A form that is merely
supported by a culture’s fixation for its meaning
will have little chance of surviving through time
and space, while a form that grows out of uni-

Olympic Theatre, Andrea Paliadio,Vincenza

The New Globe, Pentagram Design, London
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versally discernible properties will continue to
be meaningful. In the harsh light of contrast it
seems plain to me that architecture should pursue meaningfulness rather than mere meaning.
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